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Beliefs in conspiracies tend to accord with political attitudes,
making it unlikely that any one conspiracy theory will be
embraced by the country.
In the years since 9/11, conspiracy theories have regained prominence in much of the American public’s
imagination. But why do many so readily embrace certain conspiracy theories, often in the face of a profound
lack of evidence? Joseph E. Uscinski argues that in order for a person to believe in a conspiracy theory, that
person must first have a worldview that encompasses conspiratorial thinking, and second, the theory must be
in accord with their other predispositions. 
Conspiracy theories have f lourished in the United States since bef ore its f ounding. Early colonists f eared
the witches who plotted with Satan. Later, their progeny was concerned with the English King, the Illuminati,
Freemasons, communists, Mormons, Muslims, and every other group that could potentially conspire. Today,
conspiratorial accusations are thrown at powerf ul polit ical actors like the president, government agencies,
and Congress. Is Obama an illegal usurper f rom Indonesia? Did Bush and Cheney blow up the Twin Towers
and the Pentagon to start a “global war on terror”? Are world leader descendants of  an ancient line of
reptilian shape-shif ters?
Sometimes, conspiracy theories turn out to be true. Those in the early 1970s that thought Richard Nixon
was conspiring against the American people turned out to be correct. Nixon did subvert the Constitution
and did attempt to cover up those crimes. Evidence was gathered, hearings were held, admissions were
made, and people went to jail. But, in many other instances, the evidence in f avor of  conspiracy remains f ar
more wanting.
However, a lack of  evidence does not dissuade the millions of  Americans who believe in one conspiracy
theory or another. Given recent polling, it is saf e to say that nearly everyone in the US believes in at least
one conspiracy theory; most people believe in many. Why do people believe in conspiracy theories when the
evidence is of ten f limsy? Or more importantly, why do some people believe in only a f ew conspiracy
theories while others believe in many?
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Scholars have struggled with these questions f or a long time. As I argued on the EUROPP blog, there are
many popular explanations f or belief  in conspiracy theories that can be put to rest, or are at least in need
of  revision and qualif ication. For example, mental illness is not a determinate of , or prerequisite f or, holding
conspiratorial belief s (if  it  was, nearly all Americans would be mentally ill). Everything and the kitchen sink
has been blamed f or conspiracy theories; however, most of  these explanations hold only as much water as
conspiracy theories themselves. There is, however, a recently discovered and parsimonious explanation f or
conspiratorial belief s that explains the between-person variation in the number of  conspiracy theories
cit izens believe in.
As argued by both psychologists and polit ical scientists, there seems to be a worldview (or ideology) that
drives people to see the world in terms of  conspiracies. It can be thought of  as a bias against powerf ul
actors. Citizens holding such a worldview strongly are likely to see conspiracies lurking everywhere; cit izens
who don’t subscribe to this worldview are f ar less likely to see conspiracies af oot. Most people are
somewhere in between. I term this worldview the “Conspiracy Dimension.”
Much like the typical lef t- right polit ical ideology of ten discussed in the U.S., this conspiracy ideology
determines how people interpret new inf ormation, view leaders and authorit ies, and understand the world
more generally. Interestingly, as social scientists and polls have shown, this dimension of  thought exists
separately f rom lef t- right and Republican-Democrat dimensions. (In other words, people on both sides of
the polit ical divide are equally likely to see conspiracies.)
Where does this worldview come f rom? While research is still in the early stages, it is likely that
socialization plays a large role. Just like party af f iliation and ideology stem f rom early childhood
socialization (parents, education, etc.). Most people in the U.S. are socialized in such a way as to make
them skeptical of  many conspiracy theories; they are generally taught that authority f igures are benevolent.
However, some people are exposed to alternative socialization patterns, and thus are socialized to be
more accepting of  conspiracy theories accusing powerf ul actors of  secretly harming an unsuspecting
public. For example, many Af rican-Americans are socialized to be more skeptical of  authorit ies given the
past abuses they have f aced. Gen Xer’s (American born between 1965 and 1980) were socialized in the
shadow of  Watergate, Vietnam, and a series of  high-prof ile assignations; this group seems to be more
disposed towards conspiratorial thinking than generations that either came bef ore them or f ollowed. In
short, people are raised to have a certain level of  predisposit ion towards seeing conspiracies.
With this said, the conspiracy dimension is not the only dimension of  ideology that af f ect which opinions
people will or will not hold. Let’s take partisanship f or example. Republicans highly predisposed to see
conspiracies will likely believe Obama was born in Indonesia, but will be less likely to believe that Bush and
Cheney blew up the Twin Towers. On the other side, we f ind that Democrats high on the conspiracy
dimension will likely believe that Bush and Cheney were behind 9/11; but that Obama is as American as apple
pie. Democrats and Republicans with very low predisposit ions toward conspiratorial thinking will likely not
buy into either the Birther or Truther theories. People’s conspiratorial belief s need to be congruent with
their other att itudes – particularly their polit ical att itudes.
Is this good or bad? One thing that this tells us about conspiratorial belief s is that their levels should be
stable over t ime. This is f irst because those low on the conspiracy dimension will not buy into conspiracy
theories very of ten. Second, since conspiratorial belief s need to be attitude congruent in most instances,
only about a quarter to a third of  the population will believe in even the most high prof ile conspiracy
theories. Birther and Truther polls, f or example, show that these conspiracy theories at best convinced 25 -
30% of  the population. The good part of  this, is that it is very dif f icult (even though it has happened) f or
conspiratorial thinking to overtake the country and inf luence policy in a deleterious way.
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